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Abstract:
Purpose of the article: Classical and neo-classical economic theories consider a human as a rational individu-
al making logical decisions and maximizing his profit. But what if it is not the case? People making decisions 
in the real world will never be perfectly informed about product or service they want to purchase. The eco-
nomic theories propose that people make their decisions rationally, practically avoiding the risk. Nevertheless, 
where could be then ranked gamblers, bookmakers and similar people? They are not just a negligible statistical 
deviation. On the contrary, there are many of them among us. This paper presents some of demonstrations that 
are different view on making decisions.
Methodology/methods: In this paper was applied primary and secondary research. The secondary research 
was based on analysis of papers and literature published about prospect theory and expected utility theory. 
This research was used to support a critical analyse of how individuals choose among risky alternatives. The 
primary research was conducted using the questionnaire.
Scientific aim: The aim of this paper is critically describe differences between expected utility theory and 
prospect theory a differences between decision making in original research applied by Kahneman and Tversky 
and research applied in this paper.
Findings: This survey discovered, that decisions of people making decision under risk, don’t respond expected 
utility theory but prospect theory is valid. There are no differences when we compared original Kahmenam and 
Tversky survey with this paper
Conclusions: In situations where people making decision under risk, it is better to apply prospect theory then 
expected utility theory.
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JEL Classification: D01, D12
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Introduction
Classical and neo-classical economic theories consi-
der a human as a rational individual making logical 
decisions and maximizing his profit. But what if it 
is not the case? People making decisions in the real 
world will never be perfectly informed about pro-
duct or service they want to purchase.
Human beings are irrational in the real world. 
They are influenced by their emotions, feelings, me-
thod of presentation of particular information. I.e., 
variety of factors, influencing the individual, should 
be taken into account. Definitely, not a single one 
results in the maximization of profit on the basis of 
rational decision. On the contrary, people are trying 
to eliminate the risk, which they face.
Each decision that we make carries along a cer-
tain risk. We try to eliminate it especially with infor-
mation that we acquire. Whether you decide if you 
will go on a trip or which notebook you will buy, it 
always depends on information you work with and 
the method of presentation of information.
One of economic theories that deal with human de-
cision making in terms of risk is the Prospect theory. 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman are the authors 
of this theory. They have presented the Prospect theo-
ry for the first time in their article Prospect theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk (1979).
1.  Prospect theory
The theory is developed for simple prospects with 
monetary outcomes and stated probabilities, but it 
can be extended to more involved choices. (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979)
Prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the 
choice process: framing and valuation. In the fra-
ming phase, the decision maker constructs a repre-
sentation of the acts, contingencies, and outcomes 
that are relevant to the decision. In the valuation 
phase, the decision maker assesses the value of each 
prospect and chooses accordingly. (Tversky and Ka-
hneman, 1992)
People overweight outcomes that are considered 
certain, relative to outcomes which are merely pro-
bable. This is called the certainty effect. (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979)
This situation is also described by the way of pro-
bability determination. Authors divide probability 
into objective and subjective. Subjective probabili-
ty is determined by Weight (w), which is attributed 
individually by each human for each situation. It is  
determined:
Weight then indicates the subjective perception of 
each human individual. Not only it takes the distri-
bution of probability into account, but also the way 
how is the situation judged by human.
Total utility function which is known from „clas-
sical“ economic theories is in this case replaced by 
the so-called Value function (Figure 1).
Value function is:
defined on deviations from the reference point, ●
generally concave for gains and commonly con- ●
vex for losses,
steeper for losses than for gains. ●
The Prospect theory offers a nontraditional view 
upon decision making of human individuals. It de-
fies other economic theories and it also contradicts 
that human behave rationally and try to maximize 
their profit.
The goal of this article is to verify if Prospect the-
ory is applicable for conditions in Czech Republic. 
In order to verify this statement, a research realized 
by Kahneman and Tversky published in their ar-
ticle Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision 
(1986), was utilized.
2.  Expected utility theory
According to (Škapa and Vémola 2012) Daniel 
Bernoulli put basics of Expected utility theory in 
1738. Bernoullis’ followers were John von Neu-
mann and Oscar Morgenstern in 1949. Both of them 
proposed some axioms and basics conditions which 
are important for this theory. Expected utility theory 
is one of basic theories in modern economic theory.
Expected utility can be measured. Equation for 
calculating expected utility is:
 ( ) ( )
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n
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Expected utility of random results is mean value 
of individual results utility weight with their proba-
bilities. Expected utility equation is e pressed by ac-
tion X with n consequences X
j
 and its probability π
j
.
Expected utility and its amount depend on proba-
bility of each results and utility of this results. We 
expected that people are able to evaluate each result 
with some number. We can say, that people perceive 
utility like cardinal utility function (Škapa and Vé-
mola, 2012).
There are 3 groups of people in relation to the risk. 
First group is risk averse. Expected utility function 
 ( ) ( ):w p p w p→ . (1)
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is concave. On the other side, expected utility func-
tion is convex, when people are risk seeking. This 
is the second group of relation to the risk. In hard 
group belong people which are neutral to the risk. 
Their expected utility function is linear. According 
classical economy theory people are risk averse. 
(Hořejší and Soukupová, 2010)
3.  Research results
The research was realized in form of a survey. The 
questionnaire was published at website www.vypln-
to.cz. In total 114 respondents participated in the 
survey. More precisely, it was 78 women and 36 men 
in range from 15 to 77 years. The respondents stated 
their highest achieved education as follows: prima-
ry education – 2 respondents, apprenticeships – 2 
respondents, apprenticeships with GCE – 4 respon-
dents, secondary education – 35 respondents, higher 
professional education – 5 respondents, university 
education (Bachelor’s degree) – 33 respondents, 
university education (Master’s degree) – 28 respon-
dents, Higher University Education – 5 respondents. 
The survey was realized in May 2012.
The part of the survey included 14 questions 
which were taken from the article of authors (Ka-
hneman and Tversky, 1986). Authors divided ques-
tions into several groups, where they have studied 
specific phenomenon.
3.1  Failures of invariance
In this group of questions, there was observed, how do 
respondents react to questions, that are the same, but 
differently formulated. This contains questions from 
no. 1 to no. 4. They are divided into two groups.
Question no.1 was formulated in a way, that the 
respondent would know how many patients will sur-
vive if they choose surgery as a treatment method 
and concurrently how many patients will survive if 
radiation therapy would be applied. This particular 
style of formulation questions is called mortality 
frame.
QUESTION NO. 1 (Survival frame) – Which of the 
following treatment would you choose if you had 
this information:
1. Surgery – Of 100 people having surgery 90 live 
through the post-operative period, 63 are alive at 
the end of the first year and 27 are alive at the end 
of five years. (45.61%)
2. Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radia-
tion therapy all live through the treatment, 77 are 
alive at the end of one year and 23 are alive at the 
end of five years.  (54.39%)
QUESTION NO. 2 (Mortality frame) – Which of the 
following treatment would you choose if you had 
this information:
1. Surgery – Of 100 people having surgery 10 die 
during surgery or the post-operative period, 27 
die by the end of the first year and 63 die by the 
end of five years.  (50%)
2. Radiation Therapy – Of 100 people having radia-
tion therapy, none die during treatment, 23 die by 
the end of one year and 77 die by the end of five 
years.  (50%)
At question no. 1. 52 respondents (45.61%) deci-
ded that they would choose surgery, while at ques-
tion no. 2 the same decision was made by 57 re-
spondents (50%). At question no. 1. 62 respondents 
(54.39%) decided that they would choose radiation 
therapy and at question no. 2 57 respondents (50%) 
decided the same way. The difference between the-
se questions is not too striking. However, it is quite 
clear, that certain respondents are very sensitive to 
different forms of presenting questions.
The next group of questions contains question 
no. 3 and question no. 4. This pair of questions was 
focused on the outcomes that could have brought 
monetary gain or monetary loss to the respondent.
QUESTION NO. 3 (favorable prospect) – Ima-
gine that you face the following decision. Choose 
between:
1. A sure gain of 4,800 CZK.  (81.58%)
2. 25% chance to gain 20,000 CZK and 75% chan-
ce to grain nothing.  (18.42%)
QUESTION NO. 4 (unfavorable prospect) – Ima-
gine that you face the following decision. Choose 
between:
1. A sure loss of 15,000 CZK, (9.65%)
2. or 75% chance to lose 20,000 CZK and 25% 
chance to lose nothing. (90.35%)
At question no. 3, which was focused on sure 
gain, 93 respondents (81.58%) would rather choose 
value
Losses Gains
Reference point
outcome
Figure 1.  Value function. Source: Kagneman & Tversky 
1979.
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a sure gain of 4,800 CZK than 25% chance to gain 
20,000 CZK. In this case, 18.42% of respondents 
would have risked (21).
Question no. 4 had the exact opposite result. 103 re-
spondents (90.35%) would rather choose a 75% chance 
to lose 20,000 CZK than a sure loss of 15,000 CZK.
This option was chosen by 11 respondents 
(9.65%). By this pair of questions, it is certain that 
people risk more when they know they will lose mo-
ney instead of cases, in which they know that they 
will gain money.
If the expected utility theory is applied, than the uti-
lity from first choice in question no. 3 is 4,800 CZK, 
utility from second choice is 0.25 × 20 000 + 0.75× 
× 0 = 5,000 CZK. People should choose the second 
choice. The prospect theory has been confirmed.
At question no. 4 the utility of first and second cho-
ice was 15,000 CZK. It doesn’t matter which answer 
respondent chose. This result confirmed prospect the-
ory, respondents are risk averse. They preferred choi-
ce where there was an option to loose nothing before 
the choice where a sure loss was the only option.
3.2  Framing outcomes
Human decision making is affected by informati-
on that can be formulated differently. At question 
no. 5 and question no. 6 the respondent has to de-
cide between a sure gain or loss. The answers from 
respondents are then affected by the fact, if the in-
formation upon which the result of the decision de-
pends, are presented as gain or loss. Question no. 5 
is conceived in a way, that the respondent has a 
chance of a sure gain while on the opposite side, the 
question no. 6 considers a certain loss.
QUESTION NO. 5 – Assume yourself richer by 
6,000 CZK than you are today. You have to choose 
between:
1. Sure gain 2,000 CZK,  (67.54%)
2.  or 50% chance to gain 4,000 CZK and 50% 
chance to gain nothing.  (32.46%)
QUESTION NO. 6 – Assume yourself richer by 
10,000 CZK than you are today. You have to choose 
between:
1. A sure loss of 2,000 CZK,  (34.21%)
2. or 50% chance to lose nothing and 50% chance to 
lose 4 000 CZK.  (65.79%)
At question no. 5 as well as at question no. 3, the-
re was confirmed that if the respondent has a certain-
ty of gain then he rather chooses certainty than risk. 
It is a risk aversion. 77 respondents (67.54%) would 
choose a sure gain of 2,000 CZK, 37 respondents 
(32.46%) would choose the possibility of a higher 
profit. The majority of respondents is then averse to 
risk. At question no.6 the tendency is exactly opposi-
te. Respondents rather risk even if the assumed loss 
could be higher than 2,000 CZK. In this particular 
case, 39 respondents (34.21%) would choose a sure 
loss and 75 respondents (65.79%) would choose the 
risky option with a 50% chance of no loss at all.
In this particular decision making, the amount of 
gain and the stated size of amount to be decided, 
play an important part.
Preferences are quite insensitive to small chan-
ges of wealth but highly sensitive to corresponding 
changes of wealth.
If the expected utility theory is applied to both 
questions the utility for each answer is the same – 
2,000 CZK. If people should choose between sure 
and probable gain, they will choose sure gain. But 
if they have to choose between sure and probable 
loss, they will choose probable loss. Because there 
is some chance, that they lose nothing. People are 
able to risk when they can something loose but they 
are averse to risk, when there is sure gain. Prospect 
theory was confirmed in this case.
The problem of positive or negative framing is 
reflected in question no. 7 and question no. 8. Both 
questions solve the problematic of survivors during 
an outbreak of a unusual Asian disease and the appli-
cation of programs to combat the disease. Question 
no. 7 is defined on the basis of survivors, therefore 
in positive terms. On the contrary, question no. 8 is 
conceived on the basis of information about peop-
le who have died, therefore in negative terms. The 
probability of survivors or dead is the same by both 
questions. The only difference is in the matter, how 
information about the situation is conceived.
QUESTION NO. 7 (positive terms) – Imagine that 
the Czech Republic is preparing for the outbreak of 
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 
600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the pro-
grams are as follows:
1. If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be sa-
ved.  (53.51%)
2. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability 
that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability 
that no people will be saved. (46.49%)
QUESTION NO. 8 (negative terms) – Imagine 
that the Czech Republic is preparing for the outbre-
ak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to com-
bat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the 
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the 
programs are as follows:
1. If Program A is adopted 400 people will die. 
 (32.4%)
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2. If Program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability 
that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that no 
people will be saved.  (67.5%)
If the question is formulated in positive terms 
(question no.7), then 61 respondents (53.51%) would 
choose a sure salvation of 200 people. On the contra-
ry, if the question was formulated in negative terms 
– surely 400 people will die, and then 37 respondents 
(32.46%) would choose to adopt Program A.
The perception of adoption of Program B changed 
as well. If information indicated how many people 
will survive (question no. 7), then 53 respondents 
(46.49%) decided for Program B. The reason for this 
was that the probability of survivors by Program A 
was 100%. On the contrary, if respondents have to 
decide whether 400 people will surely die and 200 
people will be surely saved, then 77 respondents 
(67.54%) decided to adopt Program B, which has a 
1/3 chance that, nobody will die.
When we look at this problem with the expected 
utility theory the utility of first answers in questi-
ons no. 8 and no. 9 is same – 200 saved people, if 
program A is adopted. When program B is adopted 
there will be utility of 200 saved people. The utili-
ty is same in each answer again. Respondents could 
choose any ante and the utility would be same. In 
this case prospect theory was confirmed.
3.3  Certainty and Pseudocertainty
Certainty effect is a phenomenon when people in 
most of the major decide to choose a sure gain ra-
ther than risk. However, if people have only risky 
options to choose from, then in most cases they will 
choose the option with a higher sure gain.
QUESTION NO. 9 – Which of the following opti-
ons do you prefer?
1. A sure gain of 600 CZK, or  (51.75%)
2. 80% chance to win 900 CZK and 20% chance to 
win nothing.  (48.25%)
QUESTION NO. 10 – Which of the following opti-
ons do you prefer?
1. 25% chance to win 200 CZK and 75% chance to 
win nothing,  (22.81%)
2. or 20% chance to win 900 CZK and 80% chance 
to win nothing.  (77.19%)
At question no. 9 the respondents could choose 
between a sure gain or a risky option. 59 respondents 
(51.75%) would choose a sure gain of 600 CZK and 
55 respondents (48.25%) would rather risk in order to 
have a chance to gain 900 CZK. Even if the chance of 
a higher gain was 80%, most of the respondents deci-
ded for a sure gain (600 CZK) over the risky option.
Expected utility for first answer is 600 CZK, for 
second answer it is 720 CZK. If expected utility the-
ory is applied, respondent should choose the second 
choice than the first one.
Question no. 10 didn’t offer the respondents a 
chance for a sure gain. 26 respondents (22.81%) 
would choose a 25% chance to gain 200 CZK and 88 
respondents (77.19%) would choose a 20% chance 
to gain 900 CZK. It is obvious that if the respondent 
doesn’t have a certainty of a sure gain, then he much 
rather takes a risky option and decides for the opti-
on with lower probability in order to gain a higher 
amount of money. The respondents generally deci-
ded to take risk rather than avoiding it.
Probability in first answer of question no. 10 is 
0.25, utility for this answer is 0.25 × 200 = 50 CZK. 
Utility for second choice is 0.2 × 900 = 180 CZK. In 
this case the expected utility theory was confirmed.
Question no. 11 solves analogical problematic as 
question no. 10. The respondents again had to de-
cide between two options of win, but this time the 
game had two stages.
The probability that we can access stage two of the 
game is 25%. If respondents decided for choice no. 1, 
then there was a 25% chance of winning 600 CZK. 
It was the exact same probability as it was by choice 
no. 1 at question no. 10. By choice no. 2 the proba-
bilities multiplied. The probability that respondent 
reaches stage two of the game is 0,25. The probability 
that respondent gain 900 CZK is 0,8. If we multiply 
these probabilities (0,25 × 0,8), then we get the proba-
bility 0,2; that is 20%. The probability and win is the 
same as by choice no. 2 at question no. 10.
QUESTION NO. 11 – Consider the following two 
stage game. In the first stage, there is 75% chance 
to end the game without winning anything, and 20% 
chance to move into the second stage. Your choice 
must be made before the outcome of the first stage 
is known. If you reach the second stage you have a 
choice between:
1. A sure win of 600 CZK,  (62.28%)
2. or 80% chance to win 900 CZK and 20% chance 
to win nothing.  (37.72%)
Even though the probabilities of win are the same 
by both options as in the previous question, 71 re-
spondents (62.28%) would choose a sure win and 43 
respondents (37.72%) would rather risk in order to 
gain 900 CZK. The result is opposite as at question 
no. 10, where 22.81% would choose option no. 1 and 
77.19% would choose option no. 2. This phenomenon 
is called pseudocertainty effect. There is prospect the-
ory confirmed. If the probabilities and utilities were 
same, respondents chose opposite answers, because 
of the way which is these options formulated.
Certainty and pseudocertainty effect is not appli-
cable only on the results, whose output is money. 
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The following 3 questions solve the problematic of 
tumor treatment
QUESTION NO. 12 – In the treatment of tumors 
there is sometimes a choice between two types of 
therapies:
a) radical treatment such as extensive surgery, 
which involves some risk of imminent death,
b) moderate treatment, such as limited surgery or 
radiation therapy.
In considering each case, suppose the patient is 
a 40-year-old male. Assume that without treatment 
death is imminent (within a month) and that only 
one of the treatments can be applied.
1. 20% chance of imminent death and 80% chance 
of normal life, with an expected longevity of 30 
years.  (50%)
2. Certainty of a normal life, with an expected lon-
gevity of 18 years.  (50%)
QUESTION NO. 13 – In the treatment of tumors 
there is sometimes a choice between two types of 
therapies:
a) radical treatment such as extensive surgery, 
which involves some risk of imminent death,
b) moderate treatment, such as limited surgery or 
radiation therapy.
In considering each case, suppose the patient is 
a 40-year-old male. Assume that without treatment 
death is imminent (within a month) and that only 
one of the treatments can be applied.
1 80% chance of imminent death and 20% chance 
of normal life, with an expected longevity of 30 
years.  (74.56%)
2. 75% chance of imminent death and 25% chance 
of normal life, with an expected longevity of 18 
years.  (25.44%)
QUESTION NO. 14 – In the treatment of tumors 
there is sometimes a choice between two types of 
therapies:
a) radical treatment such as extensive surgery, 
which involves some risk of imminent death,
b) moderate treatment, such as limited surgery or 
radiation therapy
Consider a new case where there is 25% chance 
that the tumor is treatable and 75% chance that it 
is not. If the tumor is not treatable, death is immi-
nent. If the tumor is treatable, the outcomes of the 
treatment are as follows: (suppose that patient is a 
40-year-old male)
1. 20% chance of imminent death and 80% chance 
of normal life, with an expected longevity of 30 
years.  (51.75%)
2. Certainty of a normal life with an expected lon-
gevity of 18 years.  (48.25%)
At question no. 12 the answers from respondents 
are divided in the same way, both 50%. It is clear, 
that the certainty effect played no role in this case, as 
originally intended by the authors. On the other side 
even the expected utility theory wasn’t confirmed. 
Utility of the first choice was 24 years, utility of 
the second choice was 18 years. When the expected 
utility theory should by applied, respondents had to 
choose first choice over the second choice.
Question no. 13 and question no. 14 have the same 
probability of the result, but the information about 
the treatment are provided differently. 85 respon-
dents (74.56%) would choose choice no. 1 at questi-
on no. 13 and 59 respondents (51.75%) would cho-
ose choice no. 1 at question no. 14. Choice no. 2 at 
question no. 13 would be chosen by 29 respondents 
(25.44%), while the same answer at question no. 14 
would be chosen by 55 respondents (48.25%).
Probability of first choices for questions no. 13 
and no. 14 is 0.2, utility for this cases is 0.2 × 30 = 6 
years. Probability of the second choice is 0.25 × 18 = 
= 4,5 years. Both problems confirmed prospect the-
ory.
Prospect theory forms one of the foundations of 
behavioral economics, which significantly gains in 
importance over the last years. The reason for this 
is that economic theories which have been dominant 
in recent decades or centuries are not always appli-
cable on the daily human activities. The objective of 
this contribution was to determine if Prospect theory 
designed by Kahneman and Tversky is can be ap-
plied in conditions for Czech consumer.
The answers from respondents in this contribution 
at most questions correspond to the answers that Ka-
hneman and Tversky managed to obtain (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1986). Table 1 shows us the difference 
between individual answers.
If the expected utility theory was applied there 
was just one problem which confirmed this theory. 
It was with question no. 10. But this result is ques-
tionable.
QUESTION NO. 10 – Which of the following opti-
ons do you prefer?
1. 25% chance to win 200 CZK and 75% chance to 
win nothing,  (22.81%)
2. or 20% chance to win 900 CZK and 80% chance 
to win nothing.  (77.19%)
The result could be caused by low level of money. 
Respondent could perceive 200 CZK like no win. 
That why they preferred possibility to win 900 CZK. 
To verify this view it could be there some question, 
where the gain will be higher but probability will 
be same.
The difference in the answers is attributed to the 
fact that Kahnemam and Tversky did their survey in 
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1986. Answers from the current survey also clearly 
show that respondents are very sensitive to changes, 
but not as much as they were in the first survey done 
by Kahneman and Tversky.
The reason for this is that 30 years ago people per-
ceived changes of particular amounts more markedly 
than today. Even common human life was perceived 
differently than today. It is necessary to consider, if 
it wouldn’t be better to change the amounts from the 
survey that respondents can gain and reformulate 
the questions in order to better correspond to today’s 
perception of the world.
To see how much the answers vary, we used the 
correlation coefficient. Mathematical software Sta-
tistical 10 was used to calculate the correlation co-
efficient. The coefficient of correlation is 0.774 at a 
significance level 0.95. Linear dependence between 
answers from the survey made by Kahneman and 
Tversky and answers from this contribution is consi-
derable. Standard deviation was calculated at 0.2.
The f-ratio value becomes 1.6 and p-variance va-
lue becomes then 0.25. The significance level was 
initially set at 0.05 and p-variance value becomes 
then 0.25. This comparison shows us that models 
presented by Kahneman and Tversky are similar to 
this paper.
Conclusions
Prospect theory is one of the theories that criticize 
classical economic theories, especially Expected 
utility theory. It should be taken into account that 
human beings do not always behave rationally and 
try maximizing their profit. They try to eliminate the 
risk in risky situations and they make their decisions 
based upon the available information.
In the questionnaire respondents were exposed 
to these situations and it has been shown that they 
respond to the particular way how information is 
provided. Although the differences in responses 
were not as significant as in the survey made by Ka-
hneman and Tversky (1986), it was confirmed that 
people react differently, based upon the way how 
information are formulated. This fact does not only 
benefit this article but it also has a major use in mar-
keting, where the competition for customers is very 
fierce these days.
It is not possible to say, that prospect theory is 
the dominant theory in every situation and time. But 
in this paper was confirmed that in such situations 
where people making decision under risk, is pro-
spect theory the dominant theory.
Table 1.  Comparison of results with Kahneman and 
Tversky.
Question This research Kahneman & Tversky
1.1 46% 18%
1.2 54% 82%
2.1 50% 44%
2.2 50% 56%
3.1 82% 84%
3.2 18% 16%
4.1 10% 13%
4.2 90% 87%
5.1 68% 72%
5.2 32% 28%
6.1 34% 36%
6.2 66% 64%
7.1 54% 72%
7.2 46% 28%
8.1 32% 22%
8.2 68% 78%
9.1 52% 78%
9.2 48% 22%
10.1 23% 42%
10.2 77% 58%
11.1 62% 74%
11.2 38% 26%
12.1 50% 35%
12.2 50% 65%
13.1 75% 68%
13.2 25% 32%
14.1 52% 32%
14.2 48% 68%
Source: Kahneman & Tversky, 1986.
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